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We utilize a multi-sector  general  equilibrium model based on intertemporally
optimizing  agents to  study issues of trade  liberalization  and fiscal  adjustments  in the
context of the Turkish economy.  A key feature of the model is its explicit recognition
of the distortionary  consequences  of excessive borrowing  requirements of the public
sector through increased  domestic  interest  costs.  The  model results  suggest that the
postponement  of adjustment  to  growing public  debt  and  fiscal  imbalances  could  be
detrimental;  and that  in the  absence of coordinated  fiscal  reforms,  the welfare  gains
expected from trade liberalization may significantly  be negated.
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I. Introduction
The  decades  of the  1980's and  1990's  have  been  a period of transition and
adjustment  for  many  developing  countries.  The  transition,  in  various  degrees  and
stages,  entailed  elimination  of the  quantitative  barriers  to trade,  relaxation  of foreign
exchange  controls,  liberalization  of capital  markets,  and  fiscal  reforms  that  seek  to
balance revenues with expenditures.  However, many countries found some reforms far
easier to implement  than others,  and had difficulty  in sequencing  the various  stages  of
reform, while others tended to stall and not fully complete the reform process.  Indeed, a
common  concern for many Newly  Industrializing Countries (NICs)  and the  so-called
Economies  in  Transition  has  focused  on  how  to  implement  fiscal  adjustments
necessitated by the loss of revenues from trade and capital market reforms.
A typical  consequence  of ill-coordinated  reform  is a rise  in fiscal  deficits that
must then be financed by  real transfers in one form or another.  Policies to  finance the
deficit from domestic  and foreign savings have become more common than seignorage
extraction  from  monetization.  Nevertheless,  as  recent  experiences  of Mexico  and
several Asian countries show, these policies tend to crowd out private sector investment,
causing  savers,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  to  channel  funds  to  the  financing  of
government  deficits  rather than  capital  formation  (see,  e.g.  Blejer  and  Cheasty,  1989;
and the surveys in Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson,  1996).  As the ratio of the public debt to
national income rises, numerous  uncertainties  surface,  such as whether the reforms  can
be  carried  to  fruition,  or  whether  the  distortions  caused  by  deficit  financing  might
deplete  the  efficiency  gains sought  by opening  goods  markets  to the  world economy.
1 A previous version of the paper was  presented  at the  First METU  Conference on Economics,  17-20
September,  Ankara.  We  wish  to acknowledge  our  indebtedness  to Jean  Mercenier,  Agapi  Somwaru
and to colleagues at METU,  Bilkent, and Minnesota for their suggestions and critical comments.
2For these and many other reasons,  governments must often pay a risk premium  above
international market rates to clear domestic markets for public debt instruments.2
Lessons  derived  from  many  of the  liberalization  episodes  of the  1980's  and
1990's suggest that the uncoordinated  and ad hoc policies to close the "external"  and the
"fiscal"  gaps  (Bacha,  1990),  in  most  cases,  increased  the  fragility  of  the  newly
developing domestic asset markets vis-a-vis the international markets.  In the absence of
a coherent set of policies to restore the macro fundamentals, the potential volatility of the
domestic rate of interest  along with the  induced swings  of capital  in/out-flows  become
an important source of macro disequilibria.3
In this paper, we  develop  an intertemporal, multi-sector  (GE)  model  to analyze
the  nexus  of these  issues.  We  focus  on  the  effects  of rising  fiscal  debts  and  trade
liberalization  on  foreign  trade,  capital  accumulation  and  transitional  (medium-run)
growth  in  the  context  of Turkey's  post  1990  experience  with  this  problem.  The
prevalence  and nature of the problems  that the  countries  are  likely to  encounter when
trade reforms are not accompanied  by broader based fiscal reforms are briefly discussed
in the next section.  Then, in the context of this broader problem, the case of Turkey is
investigated  more  closely.  This  investigation  provides  the  context  for  the  model
specified  in  Section III  and the  empirical  analysis  then  follows.  A  special and unique
feature of the modeling  analysis  is the specification of capital  markets in a manner that
accounts  for  the  level of risk premia  apparent  in the  data.  The policy  simulations  and
results  are  discussed  in  section  IV.  The  results  suggest  that  imbalances  in  the
government fiscal accounts cause a contraction of sectoral outputs and real GDP beyond
the levels expected from trade  liberalization.  The simulation results show clearly that the
longer the  delay in making  the necessary  adjustments toward  sustainable  fiscal targets,
the  larger will be the  gap  between gains  from "coordinated"  liberalization  and the "ad
hoc"  liberalization attempts which are accompanied by accummulation of domestic  debt.
2 This rise in  the domestic rate of interest,  in many instances, could also be the result of a discretionary
policy  towards liberalizing the  capital account.  Under conditions  of an open  domestic  capital  market
facing international competition,  authorities themselves may choose to use the  interest rate as  a tool to
prevent  currency substitution -the  case where the  economic  agents may  wish to satisfy  their demand
for monetary services  by  holding  foreign-denominated  currency  or deposits, rather  than the  domestic
assets  (Tanzi and Blejer, 1982;  Girton  and  Roper,  1981; Miles,  1978).  In addition,  high interest  rates
could  as well  be taken  as  part of an  investment  finance  policy to  induce  the  desired  level of capital
inflows.  See,  e.g.,  the UNCTAD  Trade and  Development  Report,  1995  for a broad  coverage of these
issues and recent country experiences.
3 See, e.g., the country  analyses of Diaz-Alejandro  (1985);  McKinnon  (1982);  Tanzi and Blejer (1982);
Gibson and Tsakalatos (1994)  ; Fanelli et.al. (1996);  and Calvo  et. al. (1996).
3While  the model  is structured  to  characterize  these  disequilibria  as  a property  of the
transition  path, in a  real economy,  these disequilibria  may  continue indefinitely  as the
country oscillates from crisis to crisis.
II. Dilemmas  of Trade Reform
1.1  The Prevalence  of the Problem
The  salient  features  of the  problems  encountered  with  ill-coordinated  trade
liberalization experiences  can be seen from the data on fiscal balances and external debt
indicators of selected low- and middle-income  developing countries (Table  1).
<insert Table 1 approximately here>
Note  at  the  outset that,  despite  extensive  efforts  towards  trade  liberalization,
taxes  on  foreign  trade  still  claim  the  bulk  of  aggregate  fiscal  revenues  in  many
countries.4   This  is  particularly  true  for  the  low-income  tier,  especially  sub-Saharan
Africa.  Countries  like Ghana, Lesotho  and Rwanda are observed  to generate  at least a
third of their aggregate current revenues out of taxes on foreign trade transactions.  Many
low-income Asian countries,  such as Pakistan,  India, Nepal or Philippines, tend to share
this  feature,  as  well.  Among  the  lower-middle  income  countries,  e.g.,  Bolivia,
Cameroon,  and  Peru, revenues  from  foreign  trade  are  almost  equal to  revenues  from
personal  and  corporate  income.  For  the  upper-middle  income  tier,  revenues  from
foreign trade are of lesser importance; nevertheless,  cases exist here too where trade tax
revenues exceed 10%  of the aggregate fiscal revenues.
Overall,  these  observations  reveal  the  reluctance  of  many  governments  to
liberalize  foreign trade while also broadening  the tax base.  In fact, another observation
pertains to the  rather lax level of the  aggregate current  revenues of the governments  in
the  first  place.  Notwithstanding  the  important  exceptions  such  as  Egypt  (34.3%),
Bulgaria  (35.6%),  Tunisia  (29.9%)  and  Portugal  (34.3%),  many  countries  covered  in
Table  1 reported total fiscal revenues less than 20% of their respective  national incomes.
This  highlights  the  severity  of fiscal  constraints  to  pursuing  trade  reform  without
broadening the tax base.  That fiscal balances are in erosion in most of the reported set of
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c,,in the transition  economies  such as Bulgaria (12.9%),  Romania  (4.7%) and the Slovak
Republic  (4.8%), but also  in many market economies,  such as Greece  (15.5%),  Turkey
(7.0%), Pakistan (7.4%) and Egypt (4.1%).
The severity of the fiscal constraint  together with the current account  balance
is  regarded  as  one  of the  major  indicators  of the  external  fragility  of a  country,
signaling  the  associated  risk.  The  fifth  column of Table  1 documents  the relevant
data.  Countries  that  suffer  from  the  fiscal  imbalances  are  observed  to  be  closely
associated with worsening current account positions.  A culmination of these imbalances
is that economies are in an adverse position for attracting foreign funds.  Such economies
must  often  offer interest  rates  in  excess  of the  world  market  rates  in order  to  attract
foreign  capital,  the  differential  being  largely  accounted  by a risk premium.  Figure  1
offers  an illustration  of this, where  the  cluster of countries with  highly negative  fiscal
balances and high interest costs of external public debt are clearly visible.
<insert Figure 1 approximately here>
The  overall  picture  portrayed  in  Table  1 and  Figure  1 thus  underscores  the
problem  of carrying  reform  to  fruition,  as  a  large  number  of countries  are  having
difficulties in balancing their fiscal  accounts in the  course of liberalization  imparatives.
The  post-1990  experience  of the  Turkish  government's  attempt  to liberalize  trade,  its
failure to broaden the tax base,  and then its attempts  to form a customs union with the
European  Union  (EU)  in  the  presence  of faltering  fiscal  balances  and  severe  macro
disequilibria serve as an outstanding example of this problem.5
11.2 The Turkish Case
The rapid deterioration of Turkey's fiscal position during the early 1990s is well
documented. (Sak, Ozatay,  and Ozturk,  1996; Atiyas,  1995; Boratav, Tiirel and Yeldan,
4 We observe  in the World  Bank data set that out of 47 low/middle-income  developing  countries  for
which data exists for both the income and trade taxation,  24 had trade tax revenues exceeding  the total
revenues from taxes on incomes and capital gains.
5 See  Mercenier  and  Yeldan  (1997)  for  an  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  analysis  of Turkey's
recent move  to  trade  integrate  under a  customs  union  with  the EU.  Yeldan  (1997b)  also  offers  a
general  equilibrium  analysis  of the political  economy  factors behind the prolonged  unstability  of the
Turkish macro environment in the  1990's.
5ra



































"I1996;  and  Onder  et.al.,1993).  The  major  breakdown  occurred  in  the  flow  of factor
revenues  generated  by the  state  economic  enterprise  system,  and by  the rapid  rise  in
transfer payments.  The aggregate  disposable income of the public sector fell by 30%  in
real terms between 1988-1995  and the public saving-investment  gap widened by almost
4-folds.  The rise in transfers  was largely caused by political pressures associated with
the elections of 1989 and  1990.  As a ratio of GNP, transfers  rose from  6.1%  in  1991,  to
12.0%  in  1994.  Likewise,  the  saving  generation  capacity  of the public  sector eroded
severely and turned negative  after 1992.
In the  presence  of these  difficulties,  Turkey pursued  efforts to  form a customs
union with the European Union (EU) in 1995.  The government agreed to harmonize its
tariff regime, which resulted in further revenue  losses from trade taxes. The loss of these
revenues  placed  additional  strains  on  the  fiscal  balances.  Harrison,  Rutherford  and
Tarr's  (1996)  estimate  that value added taxes must be increased  by  16.2%  in order to
compensate  for this loss of revenue.  Kise and Yeldan (1995)  incorporated oligopolistic
mark-up  pricing  in  a static  CGE of 26  sectors,  and  found  the  necessary  indirect  tax
adjustment  to reach  36%.  The loss  of tariff revenues  occurred  at a time when fiscal
authorities  realized  that continued  seignorage  extraction through  monetization  was no
longer feasible; that is, the Treasury had almost fully expolited the Laffer curve (Yeldan,
1997a;  Selcuk,  1996).  Thus, these developments  led to a sharp increase  in the public
sector  borrowing  requirement  (PSBR) which  rose  to  11.7%  of the GNP  in  1993,  and
then leveled  off to about  7%  thenafter.  Since external  sources of public sector finance
were  extremely  limited6,  the  state  was  forced  to  resort  to  massive  domestic  debt
financing by issuing new debt instruments (bonds), part of which were needed to service
the existing debt.
These instruments  dominated the financial markets almost exclusively.  In 1995,
the share  of new issues of public  securities  in total  securities  issued stood  at 90%;  and
the share of public assets in the secondary market reached  to 95%  (Balkan and Yeldan,
1996).  For bond markets to clear at rising volumes, higher real rates of interest had to be
paid.  Rising rates presumably reflected not only the  rising opportunity cost of savings
but also  a  risk premia.  These  factors  combined  led  to  excessively  high  interest  rates,
crowding out private investment.
6Under these  conditions, the  stock of domestic  debt grew rapidly,  reaching  20%
of the GNP by the end of 1995.  A critical feature of debt accumulation  was its extreme
short-term maturity.  By  1992, the state was already trapped in a Ponzi-style finance  of
its  debt, with  net new government  borrowings  reaching  to  92%  of the domestic  debt
outstanding.  By  1995,  this  ratio  accelerated  to  132%.  Thus,  "management"  of the
domestic  debt  and  the  increase  in  the  fiscal  gap  emerged  as  an  issue  of paramount
importance for Turkish policy-makers in the second half of the  1990's.
The  following  pages  of the  paper  analyses  these  issues  within  the  context  of
laboratory  experiments  of an  inter-temporal  GE  model  that  is  specified  in  the  next
section.
III. The Model
With  some  modification,  the  model  utilized  in  this  section  is  an  extended
neoclassical  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model  with  a  government  whose
purpose is to collect  taxes,  administer expenditures  and  issue debt instruments.  The
model  draws  upon  the  recent  contributions  on  intertemporal  GE  modeling  by
Wilcoxen (1988),  Ho  (1989),  Goulder and Summers (1989),  Mercenier and de  Souza
(1994),  and Diao and Somwaru (1997).  Data used to  calibrate the model parameters
and to conduct  our simulation experiments  are drawn from Kose and Yeldan  (1996),
the recent  Input-Output Table of Turkey  (SIS,  1994),  and other  sources to represent
the  macro  equilibrium  of the  Turkish  economy  in  1990.  We  aggregate  production
activities into  six production  sectors  (agriculture,  consumer  manufacturing,  producer
manufacturing,  intermediates,  private services,  and public services),  employing  labor
and  capital  to produce  the  respective  single  outputs.  With  fixed  supply7, labor  is
mobile across  sectors  (but not mobile  internationally).  Capital,  on the other hand, is
sector-specific,  and is accumulated  over time.  Technological  change is  assumed not
to be influenced by the policies considered  in the paper, and hence is ignored.
6 Net foreign borrowing  of the government  during  1989-1997  was almost negative, and  in those years
when the public sector experienced  net inflows, their amount barely reached to  1 percent of the GNP
(Yeldan,  1997b).
7 This  specification  has  no  real  effects  on  the  model  since,  alternatively,  we  could  normalize  all
variables  in per capita terms.III-1  The  Household and Consumption/Savings. The  representative  household  owns
labor  and  all  private  financial  wealth,  and  allocates  income  to  consumption  and
savings to maximize  an intertemporal utility function over an infinite horizon:
1  Max U  1
1  ,_K=1  I+p
subject to the intertemporal wealth constraint:
(2)  ZR, (Zpi,c,,) = T  W,
t=l
where  p  is  the  positive  rate  of time  preference;  0  is  inverse  of the  intertemporal
elasticity of substitution;  cit is household demand  for each of the six goods; 0<ai<l,
and lai =1; pi, is the price  for good i, TWI  is the initial private  wealth,  and Rt is  a
discount factor defined as:
(3)  R, =n  1
=  (1 + r.)
and r, is the interest  rate.  The household  budget constraint  can  also  be defined  in
terms  of current income  and  expenditure  flows,  i.e.,  in  each period,  the  household
earns  incomes  from  wages,  wL,  firm's  profits,  div,  government  transfers,  TI, and
interests on government and foreign bonds, BPG + BF, such that:
(4)  SAV,  + Zp,,,c,, =(1-  ty,)[w,L,  +div,  + TI, +  r,(BPG,_ 1  + BF_)]
where  SAV  is  household  savings  which  will  be  invested  on  the  purchases  of
government and foreign bonds or firm equities; and ty is the income tax rate.
111-2.  Firms and investment.  The  representative  firm  in  each  sector  carries  both
production  and  investment  decisions  so  as to  maximize  the value  of the  firm.  The
intertemporal  decision  problem of the firm can be  stated as follows:  in each sector-i,
the firm chooses  the levels of investment, I,,,  and labor employment  to maximize the
8
y I  ypresent value of all future  profits, taking  into  account  the expected future  prices for
sectoral  outputs,  the wage  rate,  the  capital  accumulation  constraint  and  the  capital
12
adjustment  cost function,  a,,  =  ,.  Specifically,  the  firm chooses  the sequences
Ki,
{I,,L,,},
(5)  Max V, =  R,div,,  =  RI[PVAi(f,(K,  L,,)  -a,)-  wL, -PI,,
1=1  /=l
subject to
(6)  K,,,  =(1-  8,) K,,  + I,,
where  Vi  is the current market value of firm; R, was introduced  in (4)  above, and 8, is
the  sectoral  depreciation  rate.  Because  of the  recognition  of adjustment  costs  on
capital,  marginal  products  of  capital  differ  across  sectors,  resulting  in  unequal,
although optimal rates of investments.  The new capital equipment,  I, is produced  by
forgone  outputs of the six sectors with a Cobb-Douglas  function, and hence, PI, can
be written  as a function of the final good prices.  However, PI,  only represents the unit
cost  of the  forgone  outputs  used  to  produce  the  new  capital  equipment,  while  the
marginal  value  of capital  (the  well-known  Tobin's  q)  has to  take  into  account  the
Bal
adjustment costs, i.e., qi  = PI, + PVA,-.'-
81,
III-3. The  Government as the Fiscal  Authority. The government  has four interrelated
functions  in  the model:  collect  taxes,  distribute  transfers  payments,  purchase  goods
and services, and administer domestic public debt.
The model  distinguishes  three  types of tax structure.  Direct income taxes are
set  at a  given ratio  of private  income;  indirect taxes are  levied  on the  gross  output
value  in  each  sector;  and  trade taxes  are  implemented  ad  valorem  on  imports.
Government's  basic  spending  includes  the  transfer  payments  to  households,  public
consumption  expenditures  (inclusive of wage  costs of public  employees)  and interest
9costs  on  outstanding  public  debt.  Government  budget  deficit  may  arise  from  the
excess of aggregate  expenditures  over the tax income.8  The fiscal  deficit is financed
exclusively  through  new  issues  of government  bonds.  Thus,  government  bonds
issued at period t is defined as:
(7)  BPG, - BPG,_, = GDEF,
and
(8)  GDEF,  = r,BPG,_ +  r,BFG,_ 1  +  P GD,,  + TI,
- yt, HY  +  it,,PXXsX  +  tmi,  P  WM, M,]
where  GDEFt is  the  government's  budget  deficit  at  time  t;  BFG, is  the  stock  of
foreign  debt of the public  sector;  HYt  is household  gross  income,  iti  is  indirect  tax
rate for sector i, PXt is output price of good i, Xit is output of good i;  tmin  is the tariff
rate; PWMit is world price for imported good i; and Mi, denotes imports of good i.  Pit
and GDit are the price and government consumption of commodity-i, respectively.
Presuming  restricted  foreign  borrowing  opportunities,  the  public  sector's
foreign debt, BFG, is assumed to remain constant at the level given by the initial data
throughout the simulated policy experiments.  A rise in the fiscal deficit as caused by
a shock to either the government's  sources of revenue  or to its expenditure items  are
financed exclusively by new issues of public debt instruments which are purchased by
the domestic households, BPG.
To  avoid the difficulties  that would result  from modeling the  government  as
an intertemporal  optimizing  agent  (see  Mercenier  and  de  Souza,  1994),  we  assume
8 It  has to  noted  that, even though  this formulation  of the  fiscal position  of the government  is fairly
"general",  there  are  differences  of opinion  on the "precise"  calculation  of the  public  sector's budget
constraint.  In their extensive survey on the measurement offiscal deficits across countries, for instance,
Blejer and Cheasty (1992:  1644)  state that  "from  one country to the next, the considerations that need
recognition  in budgetary  analysis ... may vary widely.  Hence,  the search  for the single perfect deficit
measure  may be  futile".  In  this  study, we  rely  on  the World  Bank's  (1988:  56)  assessment  of the
deficit generating  components,  where  "expenditure  includes wages  of public employees,  spending  on
goods and fixed capital formulation,  interest on debt, transfers  and subsidies.  Revenue  includes taxes,
user charges,  interest on public assets transfers,  operating surpluses of public  companies  and the sales
of public assets".
10that the transfer payments  are proportional  to aggregate  government  revenues,  while
the  total  public  consumption  of  goods  (excluding  for  public  services)  is  set  as  a
constant  share  of the  gross  domestic  product.  Similarly,  sectoral  purchases  are
distributed according to fixed expenditure shares.
I1-4.  The  Foreign sector.  Following  the  traditional  CGE  folklore,  the  model
incorporates  the  Armingtonian  composite  good  system  for  the  determination  of
imports, and the constant elasticity of transformation  (CET) specification  for exports.
In this structure,  domestically  produced  and foreign goods are regarded  as imperfect
substitutes  in  aggregate  demand,  given  an  elasticity  of substitution/transformation.
The  economy  is  small,  hence  the  world  prices  are  regarded  as  given  constants.
However, the composite prices  do change  endogenously  as domestic  prices  adjust to
attain equilibrium  in the commodity markets.  The  output of public services consists
entirely  of civil servant wages,  and hence,  is regarded  as a (non-traded)  home  good
with government being its sole buyer.
In  each  period-equilibrium,  the  difference  between  the  household  savings,
SA V,,  and the government's borrowing requirement,  GDEF,, gives the amount of new
foreign  bonds  held  by households.  The time path of private  foreign  assets has  two
components:  trade  surplus  (deficit  if negative)  denoted  FBOR,, and  interest  income
received  from  the  accumulated  foreign  assets,  r,BF,.,.  Thus,  accumulation  of the
private foreign assets evolve as follows:
(9)  BF,-  BF,, = r,  BF,., + FBOR,,
111-5. Equilibrium.  Intra-temporal equilibrium  requires  that  at  each time  period,  (i)
domestic demand  plus export demand  for the  output of each  sector equal its  supply;
(ii)  demand  for  labor  equals  its  supply;  and  (iii)  government  spending  equals
government revenues plus new issues of public  debt instruments.  The inter-temporal
equilibria are further constrained by the following  steady state conditions:
(10)  r.,Vss  =  div,
11(11)  I,,ss = 8,iKiss
(12)  0 = r  BFs + FBORs
(13)  GDEFss =0
Equation  (10)  implies  that  at  the  steady  state,  the  value  of  the  firm,  Vs,
becomes constant and hence the profits, div,,s,  is simply  equal to the interest earnings
from  a same  amount of riskless  assets.  Equation  (11)  implies  that in each  sector-i,
investments just cover the depreciation  of sectoral  capital; hence the stock of capital
remains  constant.  Equation  (12)  states  that  foreign  asset  holding  is  constant.
Equation  (13)  is the solvency  (transversality) condition on government  debt,9 which
requires that government  debt has to be constant at the steady state.  This implies that
government  has  to  have  a surplus  on  its  primary budget  which  equals  its  interest
payments on its domestic and foreign debt.
IV. Analysis of Alternative Policy  Regimes
IV-1.  Description of the Simulation Experiments and Their Motivation
Theory  suggests that,  in the absence  of market imperfections  and/or  external
effects, trade liberalization increases  efficiency of the economy due to re-allocation of
resources among  the production  sectors.  However,  liberalization  attempts also  have
income  re-distribution  consequences,  especially  between  the  public  and  private
sectors,  as  government  revenues  from  trade  protection  fall.  This  requires  that
liberalization  episodes  necessarily  have  to  concur  with  a  stable  macroeconomic
environment,  especially  in fiscal  balances  of the public  sectors.  In many  instances,
however,  trade  liberalization  and  fiscal  reform  are  loosely  coordinated,  and  the
expected  benefits  from  reform  fail  to  be  materialized.  Persistent  fiscal  deficits
necessitate  extraction  of  financial  funds  from  the  capital  markets  which  could
otherwise be utilized in new capital formation.  On the other hand, the ongoing rise of
the borrowing requirement  of the public sector generates  additional pressures on the
12newly  developing  indigenous asset markets  and tends to  increase  uncertainty  in  the
economy.  With the  increased  risk  and the  accompanying  fragility of the  domestic
financial markets, transactors often face higher interest costs than those that prevail in
the international  markets.  Thus  a risk premium  emerges between  the domestic  and
the international  interest rates, a consequence  of which is the distortion of the saving
and investment decisions of the residents.
Given  this  background,  we  attempt  to  study  analytically  the  resource
allocation  processes  of trade  liberalization  together  with  the  ongoing  pressures  of
delayed/uncoordinated  fiscal  reform  with  the  aid  of three  simulation  experiments.
First, we envisage  an environment  in which both the trade and the fiscal  policies are
perfectly coordinated.  We eliminate  all existing tariffs on imports, and to compensate
for the losses of fiscal revenues,  we endogenously  adjust the  income tax rate.  Thus,
the fiscal budget balance of the government is maintained for all time periods, and the
trade reform has neutral consequences  for the public sector expenditure patterns.  We
treat this case as the optimal benchmark and identify as EXP-1.
Under EXP-2  and  EXP-3  we consider  a  case where  reform  causes  losses  of
tax revenues but the government  is reluctant to curtail its expenditures, or to introduce
off-setting sources of non-distorting revenue instruments.  In addition, pressures from
public  sectors  force  the  government  to  raise  public  employee's  wage  payments.
Thus,  the  government's  budget  gap  is  further  widened.  In  practice,  policies  can
seldom be perfectly coordinated due to mis-communications  among various layers  of
the  bureaucracy;  pressures  from the  domestic  interest  groups which  are  hurt by  the
reform,  and  the  like.  Thus,  the  purpose  of EXP-2  and  EXP-3  is  to  capture  such
delays  in  accommodating  the  necessary  policy  coordinations  and  to trace  out  their
consequences  on the overall economy.
Under  the EXP-2  policy  environment,  we first  portray  a  stance  of inaction,
and  delay  implementation  of the  necessary  revenue  enhancing  measures  for  20
periods. After then, the income tax rate is endogenously  adjusted so as to impose the
intertemporal  budget  (solvency)  constraint  of the  government.' 0. Under  EXP-3,  on
9 Since  the  interest  payments  are recorded  among the  current  period public  expenditures,  this  steady
state condition does not involve interest costs.
10  It has to be noted that our focus  is mainly on the evolution of the transition path, rather than the time
period when  the economy  has sufficiently  approached the  fully intertemporal  equilibrium  --the  steady
state.  One  has  to  note  that  the  eventual  attainment of the  government  budget balance  is  part  of the
technical  constraints of intertemporal  equilibrium.  This  implies that from the technical  point of view
13Table 2.  Summary of Simulation Experiments
TRADE POLICY SHOCK: Eliminate all tariffs on imports
FISCAL POLICY ALTERNATIVES  FOR THE GOVERNMENT
EXP-1  EXP-2  EXP-3
Simultaneously adjust the  1. Raise public service wages  1. Raise public service wages
income tax rates such that  and delay government income  and delay government income
the government current  adjustment for 20 periods,  adjustment for 40 periods.
budget constraint holds.
2. After period 20, income tax  2. After period 40, income tax
rate adjusts endogenously to  rate adjusts endogenously to
impose government's  solvency impose government's  solvency
constraint on its debt.  constraint on its debt.the other hand, we worsen the fiscal stance of the government  and portray  a situation
of no adjustment at all.  In this  setting,  the income  tax adjustment  is  delayed  until
period  40,  which,  for  all  practical  purposes,  amounts  a  complete  paralysis  of the
government's  ability  to  carry  out  any  viable  fiscal  reform.  Thus,  with these  two
experiments  we highlight  many  of the  basic  attributes  of the Turkish  reality  of the
1990's  with  deferral  of  the  necessary  adjustments  through  a  tax  reform;  heavy
reliance on the domestic  asset markets  for financing  the fiscal  gap; intensified use of
the  politically  motivated  high  income  transfers  initiated  to  the  private  sector;  and
diversion of the domestic rate of interest away  from the return on international  assets.
We summarize the salient features of each experiment in Table 2.
<insert Table 2 approximately here>
IV-2. Policy  Analysis
We  document  our  simulation  results  in  Tables  3  and  4,  and  portray  the
adjustment  paths of selected  variables  in  Figures  2-5.  All  results  are  reported  as
ratios to the base-run steady state.
<insert Table 3 approximately here>
Under scenario EXP-1,  the government simultaneously adjusts the income tax
rate  when  the  tariffs  are  eliminated  such  that  its  budget  balance  is  continuously
maintained.  This  tax  adjustment  neutralizes  the macro  economic  consequences  of
tariff liberalization, and does not involve any distortionary effect due to the celebrated
Ricardian equivalence. I
In this  first  best  policy  environment,  the intertemporal  nature  of our  model
allow  us to capture  both the static  gains  from resource reallocation,  and the dynamic
gains from increases in capital investment.  We observe  that investment is stimulated
the  government  eventually  has  to  raise  taxes  and/or  adjust  expenditures  to  meet  the  steady  state
equilibrium  constraint  on  fiscal  balances.  The  model  per  se  cannot  give  us  a  guideline  about  the
specific  timing of the imposition  of this endogenous adjustment,  and  one has to impose this constraint
at  an  arbitrary  point.  We  thus  rely  on  the  laboratory  characteristics  of the  model  to  impose  this
constraint  and endogenize  the  income  tax  rate  such  that  the  fiscal  balances  are  met with  no  deficit
under  the  steady  state.  Since our  exclusive  purpose  here  is  to  capture  the effects  of delayed  fiscal
reform,  our  discussion  will  focus  on  the  time  periods  before  the  tax  rate  has been  endogenized  to
impose this constraint.
"  The  Ricardian  equivalence  proposition  is  popularized  by  Barro  (1974,  1979)  and  is  extensively
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-aand  capital  is  accumulated  along  the  transitional  path (see  Figure  2).  This  allows
consumers  to enjoy gains from liberalization by raising their final  consumption  along
the whole transitional  path.  Yet, the increases  in consumption and  investment result
in an  expanding  trade  deficit  and  hence  stimulates  foreign  capital  inflows.  As  the
economy  specializes  in producing  goods  over which it has a comparative  advantage,
its  exports  start to  grow faster  than its  imports after the  18th period,  thus  the trade
deficits  start  to  fall  thenafter.  For  example,  the  consumer  manufacturing  and  the
service sectors are observed to be the major net export sectors in Turkey.  Thus, under
the  EXP-1  scenario,  liberalization  of trade  leads  to  increased  investments  towards
these two  sectors,  in comparison  to those  which were  under higher  tariff protection
initially.  Thus, outputs and hence  exports of the  consumer manufacturing  goods  and
services  grow  rapidly  after  the  returns  to  investment  are  capitalized.  These
observations  imply  that  the  initial  increases  in  trade  deficits  do  not  necessarily
deteriorate  the  economy's  balance  of payments  in  the  long  run  if the  increase  in
aggregate  investment  succeeds  in  raising  production  and  exports  of the  sectors  in
which the economy has a comparative  advantage.
The  model  solutions  reveal  that  the  steady  state  capital  stock  increases  by
14.5%,  and  aggregate  consumption  by  2.2%  in  comparison  to  the  pre-reform
equilibrium.  The expansion of aggregate capital stock enables the real gross domestic
product to increase uniformly throughout the adjustment period.  Valued  in base-year
prices, we find that the real gross domestic product is increased by 2.2% in period  10,
and  by  5.5%  in  period  30  as  the  economy  approaches  to  its  long  run  equilibrium.
(Table 4).
<insert Table 4 approximately  here>
We compute  the  social  welfare  gains  by constructing  an equivalent variation
index  which  is  a  function  of the  current  and  future  aggregate  consumption,  where
future  consumption  is  discounted  by  the  discount  rate  of time  preference.  The
welfare  gains are  summarized  and contrasted with the  alternative policy  scenarios in
Table  4.  The  welfare  gains  from  the  trade  liberalization  amount  to  0.16  percent
during  the  first  10  periods,  and  reaches  to  0.71  percent  by  the  end  of period  30.
Together  with  the  expansion  of the  real  gross  domestic  product,  these  gains  are
Barro,  1989;  Velthoven  and  Veblen,  1993).  An  extensive  critical  evaluation  of  the  Ricardian
equivalence can be  found in Buiter (1989), Bernheim  (1989), and Bernheim and Bagwell (1988).
15Table 4. Dynamic  Effects  of Alternative Policy  Regimes  on Consumer Welfare
(% Deviations from the Base-Run)
EXP-1  EXP-2  EXP-3
Real Gross Domestic Product
Period 10  2.203  1.556  1.206
Period 20  4.219  2.948  1.677
Period 30  5.518  4.760  1.532
Change in Consumer Welfare Index(*)
First 10 periods  0.164  -0.616  -1.977
First 20 periods  0.457  -0.313  -2.554
First 30 periods  0.708  0.139  -2.311
(*) Percentage  Change in Equivalent Variation Index.mainly  the  result  of  tariff  liberalization  under  conditions  of  perfect  policy
coordination with reliance on direct income taxes as first best policy instruments.
It is clear that achieving  a balance  in  the fiscal  budget by a simultaneous tax
adjustment  may not be politically  feasible,  given  the tax administration  capacity  of
the country.  Thus, next we invoke a stance of stagnation and delay the process of tax
adjustment  under scenarios  EXP-2 and EXP-3.  Furthermore,  we envisage  here that
pressures  form  the public  sector employees  are  intensified,  and that  the government
complies with the increased  wage demands  of the public employees  by raising  their
wage remunerations by 100%.12
Within the EXP-2  and EXP-3  environments,  in the absence  of compensating
measures  for  generating  revenue  sources,  a  fiscal  gap  emerges.  The  government
resorts  to  domestic  borrowing,  and  issues  debt  instruments  to  finance  its  deficits.
However,  this  added  reliance  on  the  domestic  financial  funds  leads  to  a  rise  in
uncertainty  and increases fragility of the asset markets.  This makes the domestic and
foreign  savers  increasingly  reluctant  to  be  indifferent  between  investing  in
government  debt instruments  and other  instruments  offered  in  the domestic  and the
international  markets  at the  ongoing  interest  rate.  To  depict  this phenomenon,  we
posit  a simple  function  that  maps  the  ratio  of the  fiscal  deficit  to  GDP  into  a risk
premium.  More  formally,  let  n,  denote  the  risk  premium  over  the  international
lending/borrowing rate; we set n, as
GDEF,
(14)  7, =(p
GDP,
where  (p is  a shift parameter.  Thus,  the  domestic  interest rate,  r",  diverges  from  its
foreign counterpart by n,, i.e., rDt = (1 +  tt)rFt.
We employ the simulation results of EXP-1  as the first best benchmark aginst
which  the  disctortionary  policy  environments  of  EXP-2  and  EXP-3  are  to  be
contrasted.  With  the rise  of the  risk premium,  the  fragility  of the  domestic  asset
12 These,  in fact, very much narrate the recent political-economy  impasse of the Turkish government  in
failing to implement a coherent tax reform together with increased liabilities of transfers  to the private
sector, as we highlighted in  Section II.  The analytics of this path is discussed further below.
16market  is worsened,  and the  domestic  interest  rate  increases  by  4.9  to  7.1  percent
under EXP-2, and by 4.9 to  17.8 percent under EXP-3  (Figure 3).
The  ratio  of  fiscal  debt  to  GDP  accumulates  rapidly  as  the  borrowing
conditions from the domestic market become more  and more  expensive.  To pay for
the high interest costs, the government has to increase its borrowing ever more.  Thus,
the fiscal  debt accumulates  at an  increased  speed and, for example,  by period  10 its
ratio  to  GDP  reaches  to  50%  (Figure  4).  Interest  payments  emerge  as  a  major
expenditure  item.  For the case of EXP-3,  interest costs  are observed to claim almost
60% of the aggregate public expenditures  by period  10, necessitating the government
to switch to a short-termist strategy  of Ponzi style financing  based on rolling of debt
over time, i.e., government has to issue new bonds to pay interests  on the outstanding
debt, which clearly would not be sustainable neither politically, nor economically (see
Figure 5).
Rise  of the  domestic  rate  of interest  increases  costs  and  reduces  expected
returns to investment.  Hence aggregate  investment falls in comparison with the EXP-
1 scenario.  Consequently,  the  aggregate  capital  stock  converges  to its  steady  state
level  from  below  (Figure  2);  and the  real  gross  domestic  product  falls  short  of its
EXP-1  value (Table 4).
Deceleration  of the investment demand  and the hesitant accumulation  of the
physical  capital  stocks,  together with  the  postponement  of consumption,  result  in a
stagnationary  environment  in EXP-2  and EXP-3.  These  factors  combined lead to a
fall  of the  welfare  index  from  its  pre-liberalization  level,  inhibiting  part  of the
potential welfare  gains  of trade liberalization  (Table  4).  The adjustment  path under
the EXP-3 scenario portrays an even more stringent environment,  and the delay of the
fiscal reform  coupled with the  expansionary  expenditure  policy are observed to lead
to  a contractionary  environment  where almost all  welfare  gains of liberalization  are
negated.
It is illuminating to note that, even though the initial design of the model is not
suitable  for  forecasting  analysis,  one  can  draw  striking  parallels  between  the
historically realized  development path of the Turkish economy  and the results of our
simulation experiments  in many macro aggregates  concerned,  especially  in the fiscal
indicators.  We  noted  above  in  Section  II-2  that  currently the  ratio  of the  Turkish
government's  fiscal debt to GNP  stands  at about  20%,  and the interest costs already
17Figure 2. Aggregate  Capital Stock
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1  6  11  16  21  26  31  36account for about 40 percent of the total budgetary expenditures.  In contrast, the ratio
of fiscal  debt to GNP was  only 2%  as recently as  1990.  As documented  vehemently
in many  recent  analyses of the Turkish economy  (see,  e.g.,  Yeldan,  1997b;  Boratav,
Tiirel  and Yeldan,  1996;  Ozatay,  1996;  Sak, Ozatay  and Oztiirk,  1996;  Atiyas,  1995)
the rapid deterioration  of the fiscal  balances  clearly  signals  an  unsustinable  pattern,
where  the  current  stance  of the  Turkish  fiscal  authorities  is  already  one  of Ponzi
model of debt rolling with annual net new borrowings of the public sector exceeding
its existing  stock of domestic debt.  The short termism embedded  in the maturities of
the public sector assets is a significant  cause for concern for the continued  confidence
crisis and the increased  fragility  (riskiness) of the domestic  financial  system.  These
elements,  no doubt, lie at the heart of the reason for the presence of significantly high
real  rates  of  interest  in  the  Turkish  domestic  asset  markets,  and  are  directly
responsible  for the  invigoration  of a  series  of adjustments  which,  in  the  technical
language  of our modeling  analysis,  lead  to  distortions of the investment  path  of the
economy  where  expected  gains  of trade  liberalization  are  exhausted.  The  ongoing
attempts of trade reform in an environment  characterized by coordination failures and
unsustainable  fiscal targets are  clearly  futile,  with realized  outcomes  falling  short of
expectations  of achieving  a  more  efficient  allocation  of resources  and  of a rise  in
social  welfare.  Our results  further  underscore  that  the more  delayed  the necessary
adjustments towards a sound fiscal reform, the higher would be the gap between such
expectations and their realizations.
V. Conclusions
Before summarizing  our main findings, we  feel that some caveats are in order
for  setting  the  limitations  of our modeling  approach.  First,  it has  to  be  clear  that,
there can be no distinctive conclusions  about the characterization of the  future path of
the  Turkish  economy  based  on  "calendar"  dates  from  our  model.  The  policy
experiments performed  are basically  of comparative nature  and are  meaningful  only
in relation to each other, rather than revealing forecasts of the future.
Second,  we abstained  from  an  explicit  portrayal  of the government's  saving
and investment behavior;  and hence, the spillover  effects of public consumption and
investment  on  the  private  sector  are  not  captured.  In  the  absence  of empirical
18evidence  on the nature  and  causes of such spillovers  (especially  in the  context  of a
developing  country),  we try to avoid  forming arbitrary  algebraic  characterizations  as
much as possible, and abstain from modeling the public sector as an optimizing agent.
Third,  one  has  to  note  that  the  adjustment  path  as  characterized  by  the
simulation  exercises  reflect  a  smooth  equilibrium time  horizon,  in  the  absence  of
rigidities  and/or structural bottlenecks.  Thus, the speed of transitional adjustments  in
the model economy  should not be taken as a measure of the global stability properties
of the real economy, but rather as a direct outcome of the laboratory characteristics  of
a set of macroeconomic  simulations.  For these reasons,  our results  should at best be
regarded as crude  approximations  of the long-run equilibrium  effects of public  debt
management  and  of  foreign  trade  policies  on  current  account,  output,  capital
accumulation and consumer welfare.
The model results  reveal that postponement  of adjustment  to growing public
debt  and  fiscal  imbalances  is  detrimental,  in that  it  merely  warrants  a deeper  and
wider  use  of the  relevant  tax  instruments  in  due  course.  The  simulation  results
suggest  that  with  prolonged  reliance  on  the  debt  instruments,  governments  may
aggravate the fragility  of the  domestic  asset markets,  and  lead to a distortion  of the
intertemporal  decisions  such  as  consumption/saving  and  investment.  The  results
indicate  substantial  losses  of potential  output,  and  a  significant  loss  of consumer
welfare  contrary  to expectations  of increased  efficiency  of resource  use  due to first
best economic environment of the trade reform.
In  the face of delaying  the  necessary  fiscal  reforms,  our  experiments  reveal
rapidly  expanding  ratios  of the stock  of domestic  debt to  GDP,  and  interest  costs
account for almost a third of the aggregate  fiscal revenues  under conditions of long-
run equilibrium.  With relative  contraction of the gross domestic product, the burden
of the fiscal debt is more  severe,  and  the  path of private investment  is  significantly
impeded.
Social  welfare  gains  were computed  as  changes  in the equivalent variations.
The first best policy environment,  with perfect policy coordination between trade and
fiscal reforms, leads to positive gains in this measure.  The distortionary environment
of  delayed/uncoordinated  fiscal  reforms,  however,  significantly  reduces  such
potential  gains.  Our results  show that the more  delayed the  necessary  adjustments
19towards  sustainable  fiscal  targets,  the  severer  is the  gap  between  the realizations  of
the gains from liberalization market and the theoretical expectations.
Under the analyzed patterns  of fiscal adjustment and tariff liberalization  there
could  likely  to  be  sizable  increases  in  trade  deficits  of the  Turkish  economy  as,
initially,  imports  grow  faster  than  exports,  and  investment  increases.  This  would
naturally call for the feasibility of access to foreign funds to finance the import-export
gap.  A key  concern  here  is the  fragility of the  current  external  position of Turkey,
given  the  international  standards.  As  shown  by  the  experiments  undertaken  to
capture  the conditions  of worsening  fiscal balances  and increased  servicing  costs of
external public debt, the economy would be restricted  to a slower growth path, with a
significant  rise  in domestic  resource  costs  to attain  equilibrium  in  the  commodity
markets and to accommodate the fiscal demands of the state.
Finally,  we  believe  that  the  modeling  approach  presented  in  this  study
provides  a  viable example  for an integrated treatment  of the trade  and fiscal  reform
policies within a  multi-sector, multi-factor  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model.
It  is  now  a  well-recognized  feature  of moder  macroeconomic  thought  that  the
analytics  of  fiscal  debt  management  and  trade  reform  require  an  intertemporal
framework  where  the  full  solvency  constraints  of both  the  public  and  the  private
sectors  are  taken  into  account.  By  way  of  incorporating  explicit  intertemporal
optimizing  behavior on the part of private  agents, and an  explicit recognition of the
intertemporal  budget  constraint  of the  government  simultaneously  within  an  open
economy framework,  we were able to address numerically many questions of how the
incidences  of import tariffication  and income  taxation affect rates of growth, capital
accumulation,  and consumer welfare in a manner of theoretical consistency.
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23Appendix I. Equations and Variables  of the Intertemporal Model
A.1. List of equations
The time-discrete intertemporal utility
(The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is chosen as one)
,  1  (a,  In  ci, ]
Intertemporal Value of Firms
V',l•  1  [PVA,,j(f(K,,, L,,)-  adjcost,,)-  w,L,-  PI,,I,,]
,1  H (l+rD)y
s=1
2 I
adjcost  =  (  K
J  J  K  .
J
Within period equations  (time subscript is omitted)
A. 1.1 Armington Composite Functions
PCi =  1  [p"'  (PWM,(1 + tm2))' -•"  +(1  -)fln) ~ '  PD1-"'  ]-'
Ai
M  A  - PC,
C,  '  PWM,  (1 + tm,)
C,  PD,
A. 1.2 CET Functions
24PX, = - [ 1,  '(PWE,)' +(  +  (-  r)"'  PD,'  ]'.i+
ri
E_  ]F-(I+oe)  PX,
X,  '  PWE,
D.  PXI Di  _  -(+,)  (1 - )  X,
X,  PD,_
A. 1.3 Value Added and Output Prices
1  a.  (1-a.)
PVA.  =  1  Wk.  W  l
t  a.  (1 -a.)
A.a.  i(1 -a  .
1  1  1
PVA.  = (1- it.)PX.  - PC  .10..
I  I  i  J  U
J
A. 1.4 Factor Market Equilibrium
aPVA,X, =  Wki  K,
(1-a,)PVA,  X,  =  W-  L




INTD. =  IO..X .
1  lJ
Q..PI .1 .
INVD.=  i  I ;
t  PC.
A
A. 1.6 Household Income
25Y  = (1-ty) W.L+rFBF+rDBPG+  TI +  divi
2
I
A. 1.7 Commodity Market Equilibrium
C. = CD. + GD. + E INVD  .. + INTD.
J
A.  1.8 Government Fiscal Balances
GREV = ty -HY +  tm,PWM,M, +  itiPX,X,
i  i
GEXP= TI +  PC,GD,  + rDBPG  + rFBFG
GBOR = GEXP - GREV
PCGD,  =yiGDP i ￿  PSRV  (public services)
GDPSRV  = W1  LPSRV
A. 1.9 Domestic Interest Rate
GBOR
GDP
rD = (Tl+  n)r F
A. 1.10 Trade Balance
26FBAL = Z  (PWEiE, - PWM, M,)
FBAL = FBOR + GFPAY
Dynamic  Difference  Equations
A. 1.11  Euler Equation for Consumption
Y1-  SA VJ  1+ r,-  +
Y,-SAV,  1+p
A. 1.12 Non-Arbitrage Condition for Investment
adjcost.
q.i=PI.  +2  it 1   ,t  1.
I,t
(1+ r  )q  - = Wk.  + adjcost,  + (1 - 8  )q i,t-  ,t  it  i  i,t
A. 1.13.  Sectoral Capital Accumulation
K.  = (1 - .)K.  +I. i,t +1  i  i,t  i,t
A. 1.14 Private Foreign Asset Formation (debt if negative)
BF 1, =(1+ r,F)BF,  + FBOR,
A. 1.15 Government Debt
BPGt+i = BPGt  + GBOR,
BFGt+ 1 - BFG, = 0,  for all t.
GFPAYt = -RDtBFGIr-
A. 1.16 Terminal Conditions (Steady  State Constraints)
276 .K  =ss  IiSS i  i,  SS  i,  SS
div.is
V  =
i, SS  D
SS
FBFSS  +FBORss=  0 rSS  SS  SS
GBORSS  = 0
F  D
=r  =p SS  SS
A. 1.17 Welfare Criterion (Equivalent Variation Index)
T  )t  T-a.T  at  a.
Y  InIl  ci  t   (1  +  I  )  =  1  In  c[.  ci,
t = 1+  /  Li,  t =(,1  p  i  t
where,  c,,  is base year consumption  for good i.  Thus, A. 1.17  states that the welfare
gain  resulting  from  the  policy  shocks  is  equivalent  from  the  perspective  of the




Ai  shift parameter in Armington function for good i
Si  shift parameter in CET function for i
A i  shift parameter in value added function for i
Ak  shift parameter in capital good production function
a i  share parameter in private consumption demand function for i
ai  share parameter in value added function for i
Si  share parameter in Armington function for own good i
rli  share parameter in CET function for own good i
0ij  share parameter in capital good production  function for input-i, sector-j
ami  elasticity of substitution in Armington function for i
aei  elasticity of substitution in CET function for i
IOij  input-output coefficient for i used inj
p  rate of consumer time preference
8i  capital depreciation rate
ji  capital installation adjustment cost parameter
Si  sectoral government consumption share
<p  risk function parameter
A.2.2. Exogenous variables
Lt  labor supply
tmit  tariff rate for i
itit  indirect tax rate for i
tyt  income tax rate
PWMit world import price for good i
PWEit  world export price for good i
r t  world interest rate
29A.2.3. Endogenous variables
PDit  own good price for i
PXit  producer price for i
PCit  composite good price for i
PVAit  price of value added for i
Plit  unit price of investment quantity in sector i
qit  shadow price of capital in sector i
divit  dividends of sector i
Wit  wage rate
Wkit  marginal product of capital in sector i
Xit  output of good i
Cit  total absorption of composite good i
Dit  own good i
Mit  import good i
Eit  export good i
TCt  aggregate private consumption
CDit  private consumption demand for composite good i
INVDijt  investment demand for composite good i, from sector j
INTDit  intermediate  demand for composite good i
Yt  household income
SAVt  household savings
Kit  capital stock in sector i
lit  investment quantity in sector i
FBORt new purchases of foreign assets held by the private sector
FBALt trade surplus (deficit if negative)




GFPAYt interest payments on external public debt
BPGt  government domestic debt
GDit  sectoral public consumption
· nt  risk premium
30rDt  domestic interest rate
TIt  transfers (set at a given ratio of GREV)
adjcostit  capital adjustment cost in sector i
Vit  value of the firm.
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